游说的实证模型
Empirical Models of Lobbying
Annual Review of Economics · 2020 · [{"name": "Matilde Bombardini", "affiliation": ["Canadian Institute for Advanced Research", "National Bureau of Economic Research", "University of British Columbia"]}, {"name": "Francesco Trebbi", "affiliation": ["Canadian Institute for Advanced Research", "National Bureau of Economic Research", "University of British Columbia"]}]
中文摘要
本文综述了政治经济学领域近期关于游说的实证文献。在梳理现有研究时，我们强调了特殊利益政治中的利益交换和信息问题，并指出了这两方面中至关重要的开放性问题。两个尚未解决的主要方法论问题仍然是：(a) 如何解释游说对哪些均衡政策被选择与推进的影响，以及 (b) 这些均衡政策相对于社会最优的扭曲程度。在政治经济学的主要开放性问题中，对游说福利效应的全面定量评估仍是最难以捉摸的问题之一。
Abstract
This article offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within political economy. In surveying extant research, we emphasize quid pro quo and informational issues in special interest politics and highlight crucial open questions in both. The two main unresolved methodological issues remain ( a) how to account for the impact of lobbying on which equilibrium policies are chosen and advanced and ( b) how distorted those equilibrium policies are relative to the social optimum. Of the principal open questions within political economy, a comprehensive, quantitative assessment of the welfare effects of lobbying remains one of the most elusive.