非正规性:成因与发展后果
Informality: Causes and Consequences for Development
Annual Review of Economics · 2020 · [{"name": "Gabriel Ulyssea", "affiliation": ["IZA - Institute of Labor Economics", "University of Oxford", "Centre for Economic Policy Research"]}]
中文摘要
本文回顾了关于非正规性、其成因及其对发展的后果的经济学文献, 涵盖了从识别良好的实验研究到均衡宏观模型的广泛研究体系, 近期还包括整合微观和宏观效应的结构模型。文献中现有的结果表明, 降低正规化成本并非减少非正规性的有效政策, 但可能产生正向的总体效应, 例如更高的产出和全要素生产率 (TFP)。最有效的正规化政策是在非正规性的广延边际而非集约边际上加强执法:前者能在不必然增加失业的情况下, 带来总体 TFP 和产出的显著收益。然而, 总体福利影响很可能取决于稳态之间的过渡动态, 这仍是未来研究的一个开放领域。
Abstract
This article reviews the economic literature on informality, its causes, and its consequences for development. It covers a comprehensive body of research that ranges from well-identified experimental studies to equilibrium macro models, and which more recently includes structural models that integrate both micro and macro effects. The results available in the literature indicate that lowering the costs of formality is not an effective policy to reduce informality but may generate positive aggregate effects, such as higher output and total factor productivity (TFP). The most effective formalization policy is to increase enforcement on the extensive margin but not on the intensive margin of informality. The former generates substantial gains in aggregate TFP and output, without necessarily increasing unemployment. However, the overall welfare impacts are likely to depend on the transitional dynamics between steady states, which remains an open area for future research.
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