← ireadpaper · 顶刊中的公共政策研究

税收与超级富豪

Taxation and the Superrich
Annual Review of Economics · 2020 · [{"name": "Florian Scheuer", "affiliation": ["University of Zurich"]}, {"name": "Joel Slemrod", "affiliation": ["University of Zurich", "University of Michigan", "Ross School"]}]

中文摘要

本文探讨现代最优税收累进性文献,该文献阐明了对税收的行为反应的关键作用,并说明超级富豪的收入在性质上不同于其他人的收入。部分超级富豪可能是“超级明星”,对他们而言,才能上的微小差异会被放大为大得多的收入差异;另一些人则可能身处赢者通吃的市场中,因此他们为攀登成功阶梯所付出的努力会降低他人的回报。我们强调,关键的税率弹性并非结构性参数:税基越宽、可塑性越低,且税收逃漏执法越有效,这些弹性就会越小。因此,关于税率的规范分析应同时关注税基,尤其应聚焦于资本利得,因为资本利得构成了超级富豪应税收入的很大一部分。

Abstract

This article addresses the modern optimal tax progressivity literature, which clarifies the key role of the behavioral response to taxation and accounts for the incomes of the superrich being qualitatively different from others. Some of the superrich may be “superstars” for whom small differences in talent are magnified into much larger earnings differences, while others may work in winner-take-all markets, such that their effort to climb the ladder of success reduces the returns to others. We stress that pivotal tax-rate elasticities are not structural parameters and will be smaller the broader and less plastic is the tax base and the more effective is the enforcement of tax evasion. For this reason, normative analysis of tax rates should be accompanied by attention to the tax base, with a special focus on capital gains, which comprise a large fraction of the taxable income of the superrich.
在 ireadpaper 查看全部 →