雇主与失业保险申领
Employers and Unemployment Insurance Take-Up
American Economic Review · 2025 · [{"name": "Marta Lachowska", "affiliation": ["W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research"]}, {"name": "Isaac Sorkin", "affiliation": ["Stanford University"]}, {"name": "Stephen A. Woodbury", "affiliation": ["W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research"]}]
中文摘要
我们量化了雇主在失业保险（UI）申领中的作用。雇主对申领和申诉的影响是实质性的，且二者呈负相关，这与“申诉会抑制申领”的机制相一致。与中位工资工人相比，低工资工人申领失业保险的可能性更低，其申领遭到申诉的可能性更高。雇主效应有助于解释这些收入梯度，因此，若使雇主对申领的影响趋于均等，将提高失业保险的累进性。最后，失业保险中定位误差的主要来源在于符合资格的工人未申领。(JEL J22, J31, J63, J64, J65)
Abstract
We quantify the employer's role in unemployment insurance (UI) take-up. Employer effects on claiming and appeals are substantial, and those effects are negatively correlated, consistent with appeals deterring claims. Low-wage workers are less likely to claim and more likely to have their claims appealed than median-wage workers. Employer effects help explain these income gradients, so equalizing employer effects on claiming would increase the progressivity of UI. Finally, the main source of targeting error in UI is that eligible workers do not claim. (JEL J22, J31, J63, J64, J65)