中文摘要
Galí (2014) 表明，当泡沫超过某一稳态基准时提高利率的货币政策规则，可能反常地导致泡沫偏离稳态的幅度更大。尽管如此，本评论表明，中央银行总是可以通过设定高于预期的利率来抑制泡沫，尽管可能需要大幅加息。这一点不同于 Miao、Shen 和 Wang (2019) 对 Galí (2014) 的评论：他们表明，当中央银行盯住的稳态目标不同于 Galí 所考虑的目标时，在泡沫超过这一替代基准时提高利率会导致泡沫偏离稳态的幅度更小。(JEL E13, E32, E44, E52, G12)
Abstract
Galí (2014) showed that a monetary policy rule that raises rates when bubbles exceed some steady-state benchmark can paradoxically lead to larger deviations from steady state. Nevertheless, this comment shows that a central bank can always dampen a bubble by setting a higher-than-expected rate, although it may have to raise the rate aggressively. This is a different point from the Miao, Shen, and Wang (2019) comment on Galí (2014). They showed that when the central bank targets a different steady state than Galí considered, raising rates when bubbles exceed this alternative benchmark leads to smaller deviations from steady state. (JEL E13, E32, E44, E52, G12)