买方垄断与雇主误优化解释工资为何在整数处集聚
Monopsony and Employer Misoptimization Explain Why Wages Bunch at Round Numbers
American Economic Review · 2025 · [{"name": "Arindrajit Dubé", "affiliation": ["University of Massachusetts Amherst"]}, {"name": "Alan Manning", "affiliation": ["London School of Economics and Political Science"]}, {"name": "Suresh Naidu", "affiliation": ["Columbia University"]}]
中文摘要
我们证明，行政小时工资数据在整数处呈现出显著的集聚现象。我们开展了两项实验，将 Amazon Mechanical Turk 上相同任务的工资分别围绕 0.10 美元和 1.00 美元随机化，以实验方式测度左位数字偏误；尽管估计出相当程度的买方垄断，我们仍未发现劳动供给函数在整数处存在不连续性的任何证据。我们在俄勒冈州的行政工人—企业小时工资数据中复现了上述结果。我们可以排除行为产品市场文献中所估计的注意力不足程度。我们提供证据表明，企业在工资设定上存在“误优化”行为。买方垄断程度越高，解释工资集聚现象所需的雇主误优化程度就越低。（JEL D22, J22, J31, J42）
Abstract
We show that administrative hourly wage data exhibit considerable bunching at round numbers. We run two experiments randomizing wages around $0.10 and $1.00 to experimentally measure left-digit bias for identical tasks on Amazon Mechanical Turk; we fail to find any evidence of discontinuity in the labor supply function at round numbers despite estimating a considerable degree of monopsony. We replicate these results in administrative worker-firm hourly wage data from Oregon. We can rule out inattention estimates found in the behavioral product market literature. We provide evidence that firms “misoptimize” wage setting. More monopsony requires less employer misoptimization to explain bunching. (JEL D22, J22, J31, J42)
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