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购买频率异质性下的买方动态筛选

Dynamic Screening of Buyers With Heterogeneous Purchase Frequency
Econometrica · 2026 · Johannes Hörner、Anna Sanktjohanser

中文摘要

我们考察一种动态的买方—卖方互动。作为买方私人信息的并非其估值,而是他需要交易的频率,这一区别至关重要。在存在承诺的情况下,完全剩余提取是可能的,例如通过限时优惠实现。在没有承诺的情况下,棘轮效应会得到缓解,因为不购买并不必然是强势的信号。由于时间具有信息含量,卖方会学习,并可能随时间调整其行为。当找到合适的替代卖方较为容易时,卖方会先提出混同报价,然后永久转向筛选报价;当找到合适的替代卖方需要时间时,卖方会先提出混同报价,然后偶尔尝试分离报价。

Abstract

We consider a dynamic buyer–seller interaction. Instead of the buyer's valuation, it is the frequency with which he needs to trade that is the buyer's private information. The difference matters. With commitment, full surplus extraction is possible, for instance via limited‐time offers. Without commitment, ratcheting is mitigated, as not buying is not necessarily a sign of strength. Because time is informative, the seller learns and may adjust her behavior over time. When finding a suitable alternative seller is easy, she starts with a pooling offer before permanently switching to a screening offer. When finding a suitable alternative seller takes time, she starts with a pooling offer before occasionally experimenting with separating offers.
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