竞争性信贷市场中的企业进入补贴

Journal of Political Economy · 2025 · [{"name": "Vincenzo Cuciniello", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Claudio Michelacci", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Luigi Paciello", "affiliation": []}]

中文摘要

本文在一个一般均衡模型中研究企业创建补贴：企业进入时面临融资约束，并通过发行长期债务以竞争性方式借款。如果在企业成立之前（事前）发放，补贴会降低初创企业的债务和破产率；如果作为支出返还（事后）发放，则会减少权益而非债务，从而同时提高新企业与现有企业的破产率。在按意大利南部校准的模型中，最优补贴完全为事前发放，使福利提高相当于消费的2%；若事后发放，同样的补贴将导致福利损失。

Abstract

We study business creation subsidies in a general equilibrium model where firms are financially constrained upon entry and borrow competitively by issuing long-term debt. If paid out before business formation (ex ante), the subsidy reduces start-ups’ debt and bankruptcy rates; if paid out as a refund of expenditures (ex post), it reduces equity rather than debt, raising bankruptcies among both new and existing firms. In a model calibrated to Southern Italy, the optimal subsidy is paid entirely ex ante, raising welfare by 2% of consumption. If paid ex post, the same subsidy would result in welfare losses.