多层级供应链中的最优韧性
Optimal Resilience in Multitier Supply Chains
Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Gene M. Grossman", "affiliation": ["Princeton University"]}, {"name": "Elhanan Helpman", "affiliation": ["Harvard University Press"]}, {"name": "Alejandro Sabal", "affiliation": ["Princeton University"]}]
中文摘要
前瞻性投资决定了企业供应链的韧性。此类投资会对生产网络中的其他企业产生外部性。我们在一个具有任意数量纵向生产层级的一般均衡模型中，比较了均衡配置与最优配置。我们的模型具有保护能力的内生投资、供应联系的内生形成，以及相继层级企业之间关于数量和支付的序贯谈判等特征。我们推导出能够实现第一最佳配置的政策，允许对投入品购买、网络形成和保护能力投资提供补贴。第一最佳政策仅取决于相关层级的生产函数参数。当交易补贴不可行时，韧性的第二最佳补贴取决于整个网络中的生产函数参数；并且只要买方的谈判权重沿供应链不递增，上游补贴就大于下游补贴。
Abstract
Abstract Forward-looking investments determine the resilience of firms’ supply chains. Such investments confer externalities on other firms in the production network. We compare the equilibrium and optimal allocations in a general equilibrium model with an arbitrary number of vertical production tiers. Our model features endogenous investments in protective capabilities, endogenous formation of supply links, and sequential bargaining over quantities and payments between firms in successive tiers. We derive policies that implement the first-best allocation, allowing for subsidies to input purchases, network formation, and investments in protective capabilities. The first-best policies depend only on production function parameters of the pertinent tier. When subsidies to transactions are infeasible, the second-best subsidies for resilience depend on production function parameters throughout the network, and subsidies are larger upstream than downstream whenever the bargaining weights of buyers are nonincreasing along the chain.