运用分而治之改进税收征管
Using Divide-and-Conquer to Improve Tax Collection
Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Samuel Kapon", "affiliation": ["University of California, Berkeley"]}, {"name": "Lucía Del Carpio", "affiliation": ["INSEAD", "Institut National de Statistique et d'Economie Appliquée"]}, {"name": "Sylvain Chassang", "affiliation": ["Princeton University"]}]
中文摘要
摘要：在执法能力有限的条件下，税收征管可能同时对应高欠缴与低欠缴两种均衡：高欠缴会削弱威胁的有效性，从而进一步强化高欠缴。我们借助一种被称为“分而治之”的机制设计思路，探讨打破高欠缴均衡在实践中面临的挑战。我们偏好的机制采取优先迭代执法（Prioritized Iterative Enforcement, PIE）的形式：纳税人按预期征收额与执法能力占用之比进行排序，征收威胁以小批次方式发出，以确保高可信度并促使高遵从度；在收到还款后，释放出的执法能力被用于发出下一轮威胁。我们与利马某区合作，在包含 13,432 名房产税纳税人的样本中对 PIE 进行了实验评估。数据验证并完善了我们的理论框架。一个半结构模型表明，在征收行动保持不变的情况下，PIE 将使税收收入增加约 10%。
Abstract
Abstract Tax collection with limited enforcement capacity may be consistent with both high- and low-delinquency regimes: high delinquency reduces the effectiveness of threats, thereby reinforcing high delinquency. We explore the practical challenges of unraveling the high-delinquency equilibrium using a mechanism design insight known as divide-and-conquer. Our preferred mechanism takes the form of prioritized iterative enforcement (PIE). Taxpayers are ranked using the ratio of expected collection to capacity use. Collection threats are issued in small batches to ensure high credibility and induce high compliance. Following repayments, liberated capacity is used to issue the next round of threats. In collaboration with a district of Lima, we experimentally assess PIE in a sample of 13,432 property taxpayers. The data validate and refine our theoretical framework. A semi-structural model suggests that keeping collection actions fixed, PIE would increase tax revenue by roughly 10%.