贸易战、名义刚性与货币政策

Review of Economic Studies · 2024 · [{"name": "Stéphane Auray", "affiliation": ["Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management", "École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information", "Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique", "ENSAE Paris", "École Supérieure de Commerce de Rennes"]}, {"name": "Michael B. Devereux", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research", "University of British Columbia"]}, {"name": "Aurélien Eyquem", "affiliation": ["University of Lausanne"]}]

中文摘要

本文表明，贸易战在关税与福利方面的结果会受到货币政策制度的影响。核心信息是，贸易政策与货币政策相互作用的方式，会在国际环境中放大相机抉择型货币政策的福利成本。如果各国采取灵活通胀目标制的货币政策，贸易战将相对温和，均衡关税较低，福利成本较小。而相机抉择型货币政策则意味着高得多的关税、更高的通胀率，以及显著更大的福利成本。我们利用贸易弹性、经济规模、净外国资产和贸易开放度的估计值，量化了主要经济体之间全球贸易战的影响。我们发现，通胀目标制货币政策能为所有国家带来巨大的福利收益。

Abstract

Abstract This paper shows that the outcome of trade wars for tariffs and welfare will be affected by the monetary policy regime. The key message is that trade policy interacts with monetary policy in a way that magnifies the welfare costs of discretionary monetary policy in an international setting. If countries follow monetary policies of flexible inflation targeting, trade wars are relatively mild, with low equilibrium tariffs and small welfare costs. Discretionary monetary policies imply much higher tariffs, high inflation rates, and substantially larger welfare costs. We quantify the effects of a global trade war among major economies using estimates of trade elasticities, economic size, net foreign assets, and trade openness. We find large welfare benefits of an inflation targeting monetary policy for all countries.