公务员考试与组织绩效：来自《彭德尔顿法》的证据
Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Diana Moreira", "affiliation": ["Bread for the World Institute", "University of California, Davis"]}, {"name": "Santiago Pérez", "affiliation": ["University of California, Davis"]}]
中文摘要
我们利用新近数字化的数据，研究了一项历史性改革的影响：该改革要求美国最大的海关征收辖区中部分雇员参加考试。尽管改革改善了目标雇员的专业背景并降低了人员流动率，但并未显著提高海关收入征收的成本效益。改革覆盖范围的不完整是这种部分成功的关键所在。首先，改革激励了在免试职位上的招聘，扭曲了各辖区的层级结构。其次，由于我们发现提示性证据表明各辖区的高层管理者对绩效具有重要影响，未改变其任命方式可能构成了一次错失的改进机会。（JEL D23, D73, H83, J45, N31, N41）
Abstract
We use newly digitized data to study the impacts of a historical reform that mandated exams for some employees in the largest US customs-collection districts. Although the reform improved targeted employees’ professional backgrounds and reduced turnover, it did not lead to significant improvements in the cost-effectiveness of customs revenue collection. The incomplete reach of the reform was key for this partial success. First, the reform incentivized hiring in exam-exempted positions, distorting districts’ hierarchical structure. Second, since we find suggestive evidence that districts’ top managers mattered for performance, not changing their appointment method might have constituted a missed opportunity for improvement. (JEL D23, D73, H83, J45, N31, N41)