American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2024 · Arturas Rozenas、Roya Talibova、Yuri Zhukov
中文摘要
我们利用超过1亿份解密的二战红军人员档案，研究国家镇压如何塑造士兵在战斗中付出努力的动机。通过运用多种互补的识别策略，我们发现，来自斯大林统治下战前镇压程度较高地区的士兵更可能战斗至死，也更少擅离职守，但他们因个人英勇而获得的勋章也更少。镇压所产生的强制性激励似乎以牺牲主动性为代价诱导了服从，并增加了战争的人力成本。（JEL D74, F51, H56, J45, N34, N44, P26）
Abstract
We utilize over 100 million declassified Red Army personnel records from World War II to study how state repression shapes soldiers’ motivation to exert effort in fighting. Exploiting multiple complementary identification strategies, we find that soldiers from places with higher levels of prewar repression under Stalin’s rule were more likely to fight until death and less likely to shirk their duties, but they also received fewer decorations for personal bravery. The coercive incentives created by repression appear to have induced obedience at the expense of initiative and increased the human costs of war. (JEL D74, F51, H56, J45, N34, N44, P26)