公共信息是政治家的激励：来自德里选举的实验证据
Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Abhijit Banerjee", "affiliation": ["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"]}, {"name": "Nils Enevoldsen", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Rohini Pande", "affiliation": ["Institute of Economic Growth"]}, {"name": "Michael Walton", "affiliation": ["Dana-Farber/Harvard Cancer Center"]}]
中文摘要
在选举前两年，德里三分之二的市政议员得知，自己被随机选中，将在选前接受一份报纸的"成绩单"式评定。相对于对照组议员以及来自贫民窟占比较低地区的处理组议员，贫民窟占比较高地区的处理组议员增加了亲贫支出。因随机分配的性别配额而在原选区无资格连任的处理组现任议员，只有在其成绩单显示出较强的亲贫支出记录时，才明显更可能转至其他选区参选。政党也从议员较高的亲贫支出中获得了选举收益。相比之下，在一个交叉实验中，议员并未对未公开披露的可操作信息作出反应。
Abstract
Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors’ high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed. (JEL D72, D83, H75, J16, O15, O17, O18)