精英职位准入的人力资本效应
The Human Capital Effects of Access to Elite Jobs
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Huayu Xu", "affiliation": ["Peking University"]}, {"name": "Achyuta Adhvaryu", "affiliation": ["University of California San Diego"]}]
中文摘要
我们研究了台湾获得精英官僚职位的人力资本效应，该地公务员选拔以考试成绩为依据。历史上，成功申请者的录取名额是根据个人原籍省份在中国大陆1948年的人口数量设定的。这使得某些移民群体的后裔在考试中具有更高的成功概率——从而获得更多进入精英职位的机会。1962年，这些优惠名额被统一录取政策取代。利用这一变动，我们发现优惠名额所产生的激励提升了人力资本，并改善了长期经济结果。(JEL D73, H83, J24, J45, M51)
Abstract
We study the human capital effects of access to elite bureaucratic jobs in Taiwan, where performance on an examination determines entry into the civil service. Historically, quotas for successful applicants were set based on the 1948 populations of individuals’ native provinces in mainland China. This resulted in a higher probability of success on the exam—and, thus, greater access to elite positions—for descendants of certain migrant groups. These preferential quotas were replaced in 1962 with a uniform admissions policy. Using this variation, we find that the incentives created by preferential quotas increased human capital and improved long-run economic outcomes. (JEL D73, H83, J24, J45, M51)