When Individual Politics Become Public: Do Civil Service Protections Insulate Government Workers?
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Morgan Foy", "affiliation": ["University of California, Berkeley"]}]
中文摘要
本文考察在针对威斯康星州州长的罢免请愿之后，公务员制度是否保护了州政府官僚免受政治干预。研究发现，在请愿名单公开披露后，绝大多数受州公务员法覆盖的分类雇员，其薪酬并不因签署状态而存在差异。相反，在人数较少的非分类服务岗位中，签署者在披露后时期的年薪比未签署者低约3%。这些结果表明，公务员制度保护了合格的官僚，而未受覆盖的雇员则遭到了报复。(JEL D72, D73, H75, H83, J31, J45)
Abstract
This paper examines whether the civil service system protected state bureaucrats from political interference following a recall petition against the governor of Wisconsin. I find that most classified workers, who were covered by the state civil service laws, were paid equally by signing status following the public disclosure of the petition list. Conversely, signers in the unclassified service, a smaller set of government positions, were paid about 3 percent less annually relative to nonsigners in the postdisclosure period. These results indicate that the civil service insulated qualified bureaucrats, while uncovered workers faced retribution. (JEL D72, D73, H75, H83, J31, J45)