在线世界中的消费者保护：职业许可分析
Consumer Protection in an Online World: An Analysis of Occupational Licensing
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Chiara Farronato", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research", "Harvard University"]}, {"name": "Andrey Fradkin", "affiliation": ["Boston University"]}, {"name": "Bradley Larsen", "affiliation": ["Washington University in St. Louis"]}, {"name": "Erik Brynjolfsson", "affiliation": ["Stanford University"]}]
中文摘要
我们利用一家大型家装服务在线平台的交易层面数据，研究职业许可对需求与供给的影响。我们发现，相比于专业人员经平台验证的许可状态，需求对其评价的反应更为敏感。我们提供的部分证据表明，消费者将许可与评价视为替代品。我们通过一项独立的消费者调查，确认了上述发现在平台之外同样成立。将州层面的许可监管数据与平台微观数据相结合，我们发现，更严格的许可要求与竞争减少、价格更高相关，但并未伴随需求或消费者满意度的提升。(JEL D18, J44, L74, L84)
Abstract
We study the demand and supply implications of occupational licensing using transaction-level data from a large online platform for home improvement services. We find that demand is more responsive to a professional’s reviews than to the professional’s platform-verified licensing status. We show some evidence that consumers view licenses and reviews as substitutes. We confirm the generality of our findings off the platform in an independent consumer survey. Combining state-level licensing regulation data with platform microdata, we find that more stringent requirements are associated with less competition, higher prices, and no increase in demand or consumer satisfaction. (JEL D18, J44, L74, L84)