Revisiting the Impact of Upstream Mergers with Downstream Complements and Substitutes
中文摘要
本文考察当供应商与一家向最终消费者销售产品的垄断中间商进行谈判时，上游合并如何影响谈判价格。传统观点认为，当产品对消费者而言是互补品时，此类交易会降低谈判价格；当产品是替代品时，则会提高谈判价格。其逻辑是，消费者需求关系会传导至上游谈判：互补品之间的合并会削弱供应商的议价能力，而替代品之间的合并则会增强供应商的议价能力。本文对这一观点提出质疑，表明当中间商销售的产品超出合并供应商的产品范围时，该观点并不成立。在这种情况下，即使合并供应商的产品对消费者而言是互补品，它们对中间商而言也可能表现为替代品；即使这些产品对消费者而言是替代品，对中间商而言也可能表现为互补品。这些发现表明，上游混合合并即使不存在市场封锁或垄断化行为，也可能提高价格，并有助于解释此类合并所导致的买方特定价格效应。
Abstract
Abstract I examine how upstream mergers affect negotiated prices when suppliers bargain with a monopoly intermediary selling products to final consumers. Conventional wisdom holds that such transactions lower negotiated prices when the products are complements for consumers and raise them when they are substitutes. The idea is that consumer demand relationships carry over to upstream negotiations, where mergers between complements weaken the suppliers’ bargaining leverage, while mergers between substitutes strengthen it. I challenge this view, showing that it breaks down when the intermediary sells products beyond those of the merging suppliers. In such cases, the merging suppliers’ products may act as substitutes for the intermediary even if they are complements for consumers, or as complements for the intermediary even if they are substitutes for consumers. These findings show that upstream conglomerate mergers can raise prices without foreclosure or monopolisation and help explain buyer-specific price effects resulting from such mergers.