当信息不足时：来自集中化择校系统的证据
When Information is Not Enough: Evidence from a Centralised School Choice System
The Economic Journal · 2025 · [{"name": "Kehinde F. Ajayi", "affiliation": ["Center for Global Development"]}, {"name": "Willa Friedman", "affiliation": ["University of Houston"]}, {"name": "Adrienne Lucas", "affiliation": ["Delaware College of Art and Design"]}]
中文摘要
我们在加纳实施了一项涵盖900所初中的大规模随机对照试验，加纳实行普遍的中学择校制度。本文研究在集中化学校选择机制中，向学生和家长提供有关学校特征和选择策略的信息，是否改善了结果。信息改变了家庭偏好及其申请学校的特征。学生被更高增值的学校录取，但他们按时入学或最终入学的可能性并未提高。学校信息不完整并非唯一的摩擦因素。家庭冲击和不准确的偏好预测可能共同导致了持续存在的录取偏差。
Abstract
Abstract We implemented a large-scale randomised controlled trial encompassing 900 junior high schools in Ghana, a country with universal secondary school choice, to study whether providing students and parents with information on school characteristics and selection strategies improved outcomes in a centralised school selection mechanism. Information changed households’ preferences and the characteristics of schools to which they applied. Students gained admission to higher value-added schools, yet they were not more likely to matriculate on time or at all. Incomplete school information was not the only friction. Household shocks and inaccurate preference forecasting likely contributed to continued admission deviations.