删除一个信号：来自入职前信用核查的证据
Deleting a Signal: Evidence from Pre-employment Credit Checks
Review of Economics and Statistics · 2024 · [{"name": "Alexander Bartik", "affiliation": ["University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign"]}, {"name": "Scott T. Nelson", "affiliation": ["University of Chicago"]}]
中文摘要
我们研究从市场中移除信息的影响，例如移除求职者筛选工具。我们刻画了这种移除如何损害在该信息上具有相对优势的群体：这类群体通常是指那些相对于替代信号而言，被禁止信息最为精确的群体。我们以近期禁止雇主使用信用报告数据的禁令为例说明这一点。这些禁令使黑人求职者的就业获得率下降3个百分点，并使黑人新雇员的非自愿离职率上升4个百分点，这主要是因为面试等其他筛选工具对黑人求职者的信号噪声标准差比白人求职者高出约60%。
Abstract
Abstract We study the removal of information from a market, such as a job-applicant screening tool. We characterize how removal harms groups with relative advantage in that information: typically those for whom the banned information is most precise relative to alternative signals. We illustrate this using recent bans on employers’ use of credit report data. Bans decrease job-finding rates for Black job-seekers by 3 percentage points and increase involuntary separations for Black new hires by 4 percentage points, primarily because other screening tools, such as interviews, have around 60% higher standard deviation of signal noise for Black relative to white job-seekers.