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利用价格激励界定即付即用型太阳能电力的福利

Using price incentives to bound welfare from pay as you go solar electricity
Journal of Public Economics · 2026 · [{"name": "Megan Lang", "affiliation": []}]

中文摘要

量化农村电气化的福利效应, 常常受到在采用边际上压低需求的非价格壁垒的阻碍。我基于一项随机实验研究即付即用 (PAYGo) 太阳能的需求, 实验对象为肯尼亚和卢旺达800名采用后的现有PAYGo客户。该实验随机分配激励措施, 为达到月度购买门槛的消费者降低使用的有效价格。尽管平均需求没有变化, 但实验前需求最高的消费者因该激励将其购买量提高了6%—7%。我利用这些反应估计即付即用太阳能消费者剩余的下界。我发现高需求消费者获得了较大收益, 但低需求消费者的收益大幅下降。将我的估计与文献中关于太阳能家用系统环境外部性的证据相结合, 我计算出即付即用太阳能补贴的公共资金边际价值在肯尼亚至多为1.7, 在卢旺达至多为2。

Abstract

Quantifying the welfare effects of rural electrification is often hindered by non-price barriers that depress demand at the adoption margin. I study demand for pay-as-you-go (PAYGo) solar using a randomized experiment with 800 existing PAYGo customers in Kenya and Rwanda post-adoption. The experiment randomly assigns incentives that lower the effective price of usage for consumers who meet monthly purchase thresholds. Although average demand is unchanged, consumers with the highest pre-experimental demand increase their purchases by 6–7% in response to the incentive. I use these responses to estimate a lower bound on consumer surplus from PAYGo solar. I find large gains for high-demand consumers, but benefits deteriorate substantially for low-demand consumers. Combining my estimates with evidence from the literature on the environmental externalities of solar home systems, I calculate that the marginal value of public funds for PAYGo solar subsidies is at most 1.7 in Kenya and 2 in Rwanda.
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