强制性病假工资：覆盖、使用与挤入效应
Mandated Sick Pay: Coverage, Utilization, and Crowding-in
Journal of the European Economic Association · 2025 · [{"name": "Johanna Catherine Maclean", "affiliation": ["George Mason University"]}, {"name": "Stefan Pichler", "affiliation": ["University of Groningen"]}, {"name": "Nicolas R. Ziebarth", "affiliation": ["Technische Hochschule Mannheim", "University of Mannheim"]}]
中文摘要
利用2009年至2022年的全国薪酬调查数据和双重差分方法，我们发现州层面的病假工资强制规定有效扩大了美国工人获得带薪病假的机会。在强制规定实施5年后，病假工资覆盖率从63%的基线提高了30个百分点。强制规定在实施前覆盖率较低的岗位中约束力更强。此外，强制规定大幅降低了带薪病假获取机会的不平等，这种降低既体现在企业之间，也体现在企业内部。新冠疫情强化了覆盖率和使用率既有的上升趋势。在强制规定实施5年后，边际岗位的病假使用量线性增加至每年2.4天。最后，我们发现了非强制性福利的挤入效应——我们将其称为企业为区分岗位、吸引劳动力而进行的“岗位升级”。
Abstract
Abstract Using the National Compensation Survey from 2009 to 2022 and difference-in-differences methods, we find that state-level sick pay mandates are effective in broadening access to paid sick leave for U.S. workers. Increases in sick pay coverage reach 30 percentage points from a 63% baseline 5 years post-mandate. Mandates have more bite in jobs with low pre-mandate coverage. Further, mandates reduce inequality in access to paid sick leave substantially, both across and within firms. COVID-19 reinforced existing upward trends in coverage and take-up. Five years post mandate, sick leave use has linearly increased to 2.4 days per year for marginal jobs. Finally, we find crowding-in of non-mandated benefits, which we label “job upscaling” by firms to differentiate jobs and attract labor.