中央银行可信度与财政责任
Central Bank Credibility and Fiscal Responsibility
AER: Insights · 2024 · [{"name": "Jesse Schreger", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research"]}, {"name": "Pierre Yared", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Emilio Zaratiegui", "affiliation": ["Columbia University"]}]
中文摘要
我们考察一个具有战略性货币与财政互动的新凯恩斯模型。财政当局最大化社会福利。货币政策被委托给具有反通胀偏向的中央银行，而该中央银行存在承诺不足的问题。中央银行鹰派程度对债务发行的影响是非单调的：鹰派程度提高既会降低财政刺激的收益，又会同时增加实际债务容量。从较高的鹰派（鸽派）程度出发，中央银行反通胀偏向的边际增加会减少（增加）债务发行。（JEL E12, E31, E52, E58, E62, H63）
Abstract
We consider a New Keynesian model with strategic monetary and fiscal interactions. The fiscal authority maximizes social welfare. Monetary policy is delegated to a central bank with an anti-inflation bias that suffers from a lack of commitment. The impact of central bank hawkishness on debt issuance is nonmonotonic because increased hawkishness reduces the benefit from fiscal stimulus while simultaneously increasing real debt capacity. Starting from high levels of hawkishness (dovishness), a marginal increase in the central bank’s anti-inflation bias decreases (increases) debt issuance. (JEL E12, E31, E52, E58, E62, H63)