劳动力市场制度与工资设定权力

Journal of Human Resources · 2026 · [{"name": "Francesco Amodio", "affiliation": ["McGill University"]}, {"name": "Emanuele Brancati", "affiliation": ["Sapienza University of Rome"]}, {"name": "Nicolás de Roux", "affiliation": ["Universidad de Los Andes", "Universidad de Los Andes"]}, {"name": "Michele Di Maio", "affiliation": ["Unitelma Sapienza University"]}]

中文摘要

我们测度了 16 个拉丁美洲和加勒比国家企业的工资设定权力。利用企业对贸易和汇率的暴露程度的差异，我们构造劳动需求冲击，以刻画企业层面的劳动供给曲线并量化劳动力市场势力。我们估计的逆劳动供给弹性（劳动供给弹性倒数）为 0.82，这意味着每多生产 1 美元产出，工人获得其中的 55 美分。在工会密度较低、集体谈判受限且没有失业保护的国家，企业的工资设定权力显著更高。这凸显了劳动力市场制度在塑造企业工资设定权力以及贸易收益分配方面的作用。

Abstract

<h3>Abstract</h3> We measure firms’ wage-setting power in 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries. Exploiting variation in firms’ exposure to trade and exchange rates, we generate shocks to labor demand to trace out firm-level labor supply curves and quantify labor market power. We estimate an inverse labor supply elasticity of 0.82, implying that workers receive 55 cents per additional dollar produced. Wage-setting power is significantly higher among firms in countries with lower union density, limited collective bargaining, and no unemployment protection. This underscores the role of labor market institutions in shaping firms’ wagesetting power and the distribution of the gains from trade.