立法与多边谈判
Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining
Annual Review of Economics · 2019 · [{"name": "Hülya Eraslan", "affiliation": ["Rice University"]}, {"name": "Kirill S. Evdokimov", "affiliation": ["Rice University"]}]
中文摘要
本文是关于立法与多边谈判理论文献的综述，首先介绍了开创性的 Baron-Ferejohn 模型。随后，综述涵盖以下扩展内容：在议价能力、投票权重以及时间和风险偏好方面存在不对称的参与者之间的谈判；空间谈判；对随机剩余的谈判；对公共物品的谈判；采用其他谈判协议（即参与者提出要求、竞争获得认可或提出反提案）的立法谈判；以及包含廉价磋商（cheap talk）沟通的立法谈判。
Abstract
This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.