买方垄断与后置薪酬：来自公共会计师的理论与证据

中文摘要

在买方垄断模型中，工资折减会造成无谓损失，因而是无效率的。然而，在具有后置效率工资的模型中也会出现工资折减，其设计目的是激励职业生涯早期的劳动者付出努力，因而是有效率的。为了调和并在实证上区分这两种机制，我们构建了一个纳入劳动力市场势力与内生努力的动态模型。利用美国公共会计师事务所的新颖数据估计一个团队生产模型，我们发现了两种机制并存的证据：初级员工的工资折减与资深员工的工资加成反映了旨在提供激励的后置薪酬安排，而买方垄断势力则导致了15%的“终身”工资折减。

Abstract

In monopsony models, wage markdowns induce deadweight loss and are therefore inefficient. Yet markdowns also arise in models with backloaded efficiency pay, where they are designed to induce effort among early-career workers and are thus efficient. To reconcile—and empirically distinguish—these two mechanisms, we build a dynamic model incorporating labor market power and endogenous effort. Estimating a team production model on novel data on U.S. public accounting firms, we find evidence of both: markdowns for junior workers and markups for senior ones reflect incentive-providing backloading, while monopsony power induces a ‘lifetime’ wage markdown of 15%.