买方垄断与延后薪酬：来自公共会计师的理论与证据
Monopsony and Backloaded Compensation: Theory and Evidence from Public Accountants
NBER Working Papers · 2026 · [{"name": "Michael Rubens", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Bernardo S. Silveira", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
在买方垄断模型中，工资折价会造成无谓损失，因而是无效率的。然而，在具有薪酬后置特征的效率工资模型中，折价同样会出现，其作用是激励职业生涯早期的员工努力工作，因而是有效率的。为调和并在实证上区分这两种机制，我们构建了一个纳入劳动力市场势力与内生努力的动态模型。基于美国公共会计师事务所的新数据，我们估计了一个团队生产模型，发现两种机制的证据同时存在：初级员工的工资折价与高级员工的工资加价，反映了具有激励作用的薪酬后置安排；而买方垄断势力则导致了15%的“终生”工资折价。
Abstract
In monopsony models, wage markdowns induce deadweight loss and are therefore inefficient. Yet markdowns also arise in models with backloaded efficiency pay, where they are designed to induce effort among early-career workers and are thus efficient. To reconcile—and empirically distinguish—these two mechanisms, we build a dynamic model incorporating labor market power and endogenous effort. Estimating a team production model on novel data on U.S. public accounting firms, we find evidence of both: markdowns for junior workers and markups for senior ones reflect incentive-providing backloading, while monopsony power induces a ‘lifetime’ wage markdown of 15%.