买方寡头与集体谈判
Oligopsony and Collective Bargaining
NBER Working Papers · 2026 · [{"name": "Tirza J. Angerhofer", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Allan Collard-Wexler", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Matthew C. Weinberg", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
面临有限劳动力市场竞争的雇主可能会将工资压低至社会最优水平以下。工会可以通过集体谈判抵消这种工资压制效应，但也可能将工资推高至社会最优水平之上，从而导致工作配给。我们构建了一个劳动力供给、劳动力需求与工资谈判的结构模型，采用纳什-纳什(Nash-in-Nash)议价框架，估计了2013年至2019年宾夕法尼亚州K-12公立学校系统中地方教师工会与学区之间围绕工资展开的谈判过程。我们将谈判均衡下的工资与雇佣水平，与买方寡头工资标价情景以及社会规划者情景进行了比较。平均而言，买方寡头将工资压低至社会最优水平以下7%，而集体谈判则将工资推高至社会最优水平以上8%。但平均值掩盖了因议价能力差异而产生的显著学区层面异质性：由于跨学区外部性的存在——即一所学校的高工资会导致其雇佣减少，从而增加其他地区的劳动力供给——28%的学区在公立学校工会化后的工资反而低于未工会化时的水平。
Abstract
Employers facing limited labor market competition may suppress wages below socially optimal levels. Unions can counteract wage suppression through collective bargaining, though they may also push wages above the socially optimal level and lead to job rationing. We estimate a structural model of labor supply, labor demand, and Nash-in-Nash bargaining over wages between local teacher unions and school districts in Pennsylvania’s K-12 public school system from 2013 to 2019. We compare negotiated equilibrium wages and employment to oligopsony wage posting and social planner scenarios. On average, oligopsony reduces wages 7 percent below the social optimum, while collective bargaining raises wages 8 percent above it. Averages mask substantial district-level heterogeneity driven by bargaining power variation. Twenty-eight percent of school districts have salaries lower when public schools are unionized than when they are not due to cross-district externalities, where high salaries at one school cause hiring reductions that increase labor supply elsewhere.