NBER Working Papers · 2026 · Tirza J. Angerhofer、Allan Collard-Wexler、Matthew C. Weinberg
中文摘要
面临有限劳动力市场竞争的雇主可能会将工资压低至社会最优水平以下。工会可以通过集体谈判抵消工资压制，尽管它们也可能将工资推高至社会最优水平以上，并导致工作配给。我们估计了一个结构模型，涵盖劳动力供给、劳动力需求，以及2013年至2019年间宾夕法尼亚州K-12公立学校系统中地方教师工会与学区之间围绕工资进行的Nash-in-Nash谈判。我们将谈判形成的均衡工资与就业，同寡头买方垄断工资发布情景及社会规划者情景进行比较。平均而言，寡头买方垄断使工资比社会最优水平低7%，而集体谈判使工资比社会最优水平高8%。平均值掩盖了由谈判能力差异驱动的显著学区层面异质性。由于跨学区外部性——一所学校的高工资导致其减少招聘，从而增加其他地区的劳动力供给——28%的学区在公立学校工会化时的工资反而低于未工会化时的水平。
Abstract
Employers facing limited labor market competition may suppress wages below socially optimal levels. Unions can counteract wage suppression through collective bargaining, though they may also push wages above the socially optimal level and lead to job rationing. We estimate a structural model of labor supply, labor demand, and Nash-in-Nash bargaining over wages between local teacher unions and school districts in Pennsylvania’s K-12 public school system from 2013 to 2019. We compare negotiated equilibrium wages and employment to oligopsony wage posting and social planner scenarios. On average, oligopsony reduces wages 7 percent below the social optimum, while collective bargaining raises wages 8 percent above it. Averages mask substantial district-level heterogeneity driven by bargaining power variation. Twenty-eight percent of school districts have salaries lower when public schools are unionized than when they are not due to cross-district externalities, where high salaries at one school cause hiring reductions that increase labor supply elsewhere.