Competition and Anomalies Redux: Evidence from U.S. Auto Dealers
NBER Working Papers · 2026 · David B. Huffman、Lamar Pierce、Alex Rees-Jones、Germán J. Reyes
中文摘要
我们考察经销商如何在一家美国汽车制造商提供的奖金合同之间作出选择。在我们的数据中，经销商在20%的观测中选择了非利润最大化选项，使犯错的经销商平均每年损失18,453美元。我们考察犯此类错误的倾向如何随竞争程度而变化，分别利用横截面差异以及同一经销商随时间的变化进行识别。两项分析均表明，竞争加剧会大幅降低犯错率。然而，即使在竞争最激烈的市场中，造成实质损失的错误仍然存在。我们的结果提示，竞争主要通过经销商自身行为的变化，而非进入与退出，发挥约束作用。
Abstract
We examine a choice between bonus contracts offered to dealers of a U.S. auto manufacturer. In our data, dealers select the non-profit-maximizing option in 20 percent of observations, costing the mistaken dealers $18,453 per year on average. We examine how the propensity to make this mistake varies with competition, identified both cross-sectionally and within dealers over time. Both analyses show that greater competition substantially lowers the rate of mistakes. However, even in the most competitive markets, consequential mistakes persist. Our results suggest that competition disciplines mainly through within-dealer changes in behavior rather than entry and exit.