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The Comprehensive Debt-Resolution Package and the Refinancing of Local Government Hidden Debt: Evidence from the Resumption of Special Refinancing Bond Issuance

一揽子化债方案和地方隐性债务置换——基于特殊再融资债券重启的视角
管理世界 · 2026 · 王姝晶、吴良钰、张云、侯若阳

中文摘要

China has implemented multiple rounds of debt refinancing since 2015. From the perspective of the resumption of special refinancing bond issuance in 2023, this paper investigates the effects of the comprehensive debt-resolution package on local government hidden debt. The results show that, relative to regions with low debt risk, the resumption of special refinancing bond issuance significantly reduced both issuance spreads and trading spreads on urban investment bonds in regions with high debt risk. Mechanism tests indicate that the resumed issuance strengthened expectations of implicit government guarantees, thereby lowering the financing costs of urban investment bonds. Moreover, both the reduction in spreads and the increase in guarantee expectations were concentrated among urban investment bonds with shorter maturities, higher leverage ratios, and higher ratings. These findings are consistent with the debt option model based on implicit government guarantees developed in this paper. Meanwhile, relative to regions with low debt risk, urban investment platforms in regions with high debt risk increased their issuance of short-term urban investment bonds, suggesting that maturity mismatch risk intensified from the perspective of urban investment platforms. Further analysis, however, finds that the resumed issuance effectively reduced the outstanding stock of urban investment bonds and interest expenditures by converting hidden debt into explicit debt, thereby alleviating debt costs and maturity mismatch risk from the perspective of local governments. At the macro level, although the resumed issuance increased local government fiscal expenditure, its effect on short-term GDP was not yet significant. Accordingly, this paper emphasizes that, in preventing and resolving risks associated with local government hidden debt, differentiated debt refinancing measures should be improved; specialized bond instruments such as special refinancing bonds should be put to effective use; and the relationships among debt refinancing, the transformation of urban investment platforms, and local fiscal planning should be properly managed.

Abstract

2015年起我国已实施多轮债务置换,本文基于2023年特殊再融资债券重启发行的视角,探究一揽子化债方案对地方隐性债务的影响。研究发现,相较于低债务风险地区,本轮特殊再融资债券重启显著降低了高债务风险地区城投债的发行利差和交易利差。机制检验结果显示,本轮重启发行强化了政府隐性担保预期,从而降低了城投债融资成本;且利差降低和担保预期提升均集中在期限较短、高杠杆率和高评级的城投债。这与本文构建的基于政府隐性担保的债务期权模型相符合。同时,相较于低债务风险地区,高债务风险地区城投平台增加了短期城投债发行规模,从城投平台视角看,期限错配风险有所加剧。但进一步研究发现,本轮重启发行通过将隐性债务转化为显性债务,有效降低了城投债存量和利息支出,从地方政府视角看,缓解了债务成本和期限错配风险。在宏观层面上,本轮重启发行虽然促进了地方政府财政支出增加,但是对短期GDP影响尚不显著。因此本文强调,在防范化解地方隐性债务风险过程中,要完善差异化债务置换措施;使用好特殊再融资债券等专项债券工具;处理好债务置换和城投平台转型、地方财政规划间的关系。
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