Econometrica · 2025 · [{"name": "Nicola Rosaia", "affiliation": ["Columbia University"]}]
中文摘要
本文研究基于应用程序的交通运输领域中，平台竞争是否会造成浪费，以及整合相互竞争的网络能否提高效率。本文构建了一个网约车市场的空间模型，其中相互竞争的平台以策略性方式定价，并使用纽约市两家主要平台的详细数据对该模型进行估计。通过将现状与模拟的反事实情形进行比较，本文发现：(i) 平台市场势力以及用户在不同网络间的分割，每年造成1.76亿美元的社会福利损失，并浪费司机所产生交通流量的21%；(ii) 平台合并需要在"将所有用户汇集至单一网络"带来的收益与"市场势力增强"造成的损害之间进行权衡：合并将使交通流量减少8%，但由于价格上涨4%，消费者剩余每年将减少7700万美元；(iii) 互操作性监管能够在不削弱竞争的前提下带来这些收益，使浪费性交通流量减少6%，同时令消费者剩余每年增加6300万美元。
Abstract
I study whether platform competition in app‐based transportation generates waste and whether consolidating competing networks would improve efficiency. I build a spatial model of a ride‐hailing market where competing platforms set prices strategically and estimate it using detailed data from two major platforms in New York City. Comparing the status quo to simulated counterfactuals, I find that: (i) platform market power and the fragmentation of users across networks cause a $176 million annual loss in social welfare and waste 21% of driver‐generated traffic; (ii) a platform merger would trade off gains from pooling all users into a single network against harms from greater market power, reducing traffic by 8% but lowering consumer surplus by $77 million per year due to a 4% price hike; and (iii) interoperability regulations would bring these gains without undermining competition, reducing wasteful traffic by 6% while raising consumer surplus by $63 million per year.