中文摘要
本文研究基于应用程序的交通运输服务中，平台竞争是否会造成浪费，以及整合相互竞争的网络能否提高效率。本文构建了一个网约车市场的空间模型，其中相互竞争的平台策略性地设定价格，并利用纽约市两家主要平台的详细数据进行估计。通过将现状与模拟的反事实情形进行比较，本文发现：（i）平台市场势力以及用户分散于不同网络所造成的碎片化，导致每年1.76亿美元的社会福利损失，并使司机产生的交通流量中有21%被浪费；（ii）平台合并需要在将所有用户汇集到单一网络所带来的收益与市场势力增强所造成的损害之间进行权衡：合并会使交通流量减少8%，但由于价格上涨4%，消费者剩余每年减少7700万美元；（iii）互操作性监管能够在不削弱竞争的情况下实现这些收益，使浪费性交通流量减少6%，同时使消费者剩余每年增加6300万美元。
Abstract
I study whether platform competition in app‐based transportation generates waste and whether consolidating competing networks would improve efficiency. I build a spatial model of a ride‐hailing market where competing platforms set prices strategically and estimate it using detailed data from two major platforms in New York City. Comparing the status quo to simulated counterfactuals, I find that: (i) platform market power and the fragmentation of users across networks cause a $176 million annual loss in social welfare and waste 21% of driver‐generated traffic; (ii) a platform merger would trade off gains from pooling all users into a single network against harms from greater market power, reducing traffic by 8% but lowering consumer surplus by $77 million per year due to a 4% price hike; and (iii) interoperability regulations would bring these gains without undermining competition, reducing wasteful traffic by 6% while raising consumer surplus by $63 million per year.