利用气候变化分歧：理论与证据
Leveraging the Disagreement on Climate Change: Theory and Evidence
Journal of Political Economy · 2025 · [{"name": "Laura Bakkensen", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Toàn Phan", "affiliation": ["Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond"]}, {"name": "Tsz-Nga Wong", "affiliation": ["Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond"]}]
中文摘要
我们构建了一个包含期限选择的信贷搜寻模型，模型中各主体对长期灾害将于何时损害抵押资产存在分歧。模型预测，对灾害持悲观预期的主体更有可能通过加杠杆购买风险资产，并偏好期限更长的债务合约。直观而言，悲观者将债务合约的违约选择权视为隐性的灾害保险，其保障范围随期限延长而隐性扩大，且从乐观的贷款人处获得该保障的成本更低。利用高分辨率海平面上升预测，以及关于沿海房地产和抵押贷款的综合专有数据，我们发现了稳健支持这些预测的证据。这些发现为强制保险、证券化、灾害援助和金融稳定等政策提供了相关启示。
Abstract
We develop a credit search model with maturity choice where agents disagree on when a long-run disaster will damage collateral assets. It predicts that disaster-pessimistic agents are more likely to leverage risky asset purchases and prefer debt contracts with longer maturities. Intuitively, pessimists value the default option of debt contracts as implicit disaster insurance, whose coverage increases with maturity implicitly and costs less to optimistic lenders. Using high-resolution sea level rise projections and comprehensive propriety data on coastal real estate and mortgages, we find robust evidence of these predictions. The findings provide relevant policy implications on insurance mandates, securitization, disaster assistance, and financial stability.