选举中的说服与信息加总

Journal of Political Economy · 2025 · [{"name": "Carl Heese", "affiliation": ["University of Hong Kong"]}, {"name": "Stephan Lauermann", "affiliation": ["Economic Policy Institute", "University of Bonn", "Centre for Economic Policy Research"]}]

中文摘要

本文研究一场大规模多数决选举，其中选民具有异质性的私人偏好和外生私人信号。我们证明，贝叶斯说服者可以通过提供额外信息，在某个均衡中实现任何依状态而定的结果。在这一设定下，如果没有说服者提供的信息，孔多塞陪审团定理的一个版本成立。说服不要求详细了解选民的私人信息与偏好：同一额外信息在不同环境中均有效。这些结果几乎不要求说服者具备承诺能力。最后，这一说服机制在成员少至15人的小型委员会中同样有效。

Abstract

This paper studies a large majority election with voters who have heterogeneous, private preferences and exogenous private signals. We show that a Bayesian persuader can implement any state-contingent outcome in some equilibrium by providing additional information. In this setting, without the persuader's information, a version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds. Persuasion does not require detailed knowledge of the voters' private information and preferences: the same additional information is effective across environments. The results require almost no commitment power by the persuader. Finally, the persuasion mechanism is effective also in small committees with as few as 15 members.