数字抵押品
Digital Collateral
Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2024 · [{"name": "Paul Gertler", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "University of California, Berkeley"]}, {"name": "Brett Green", "affiliation": ["Washington University in St. Louis"]}, {"name": "Catherine Wolfram", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research"]}]
中文摘要
近年来,一种利用“数字抵押品”进行担保放贷的新型信贷形式逐渐兴起,在中低收入国家尤为突出。数字抵押品依赖于锁定技术,使贷款人无需实际收回抵押品,即可暂时阻断该抵押品为借款人带来的使用价值。我们通过一个理论模型和一项田野实验研究这种新型信贷:实验中的学费贷款以太阳能家用系统作为数字抵押品进行担保。以数字抵押品为贷款提供担保使违约率大幅下降(降低19个百分点),并使贷款人的回报率提高49个百分点。我们采用Karlan和Zinman(2009)方法的一个变体,对还款的总效应进行分解,发现其中约三分之二可归因于道德风险,三分之一可归因于逆向选择。此外,获得数字担保的学费贷款显著提高了入学率和学校相关支出,且未对家庭资产负债表产生不利影响。
Abstract
Abstract A new form of secured lending using “digital collateral” has recently emerged, most prominently in low- and middle-income countries. Digital collateral relies on lockout technology, which allows the lender to temporarily disable the flow value of the collateral to the borrower without physically repossessing it. We explore this new form of credit in a model and a field experiment using school-fee loans digitally secured with a solar home system. Securing a loan with digital collateral drastically reduced default rates (by 19 percentage points) and increased the lender’s rate of return (by 49 percentage points). Using a variant of the Karlan and Zinman (2009) methodology, we decompose the total effect on repayment and find that roughly two-thirds is attributable to moral hazard, and one-third to adverse selection. In addition, access to digitally secured school-fee loans significantly increased school enrollment and school-related expenditures without detrimental effects on households’ balance sheets.
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