Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2024 · Paul Gertler、Brett Green、Catherine Wolfram
中文摘要
近来,一种使用“数字抵押品”的新型担保贷款已经出现,在中低收入国家尤为突出。数字抵押品依赖锁定技术,该技术允许贷款人在无须实际收回抵押品的情况下,暂时切断抵押品流向借款人的使用价值。我们通过一个模型和一项实地实验探讨这种新型信贷;实验中的学费贷款以太阳能家庭系统作为数字抵押品担保。使用数字抵押品为贷款提供担保大幅降低了违约率(降低19个百分点),并提高了贷款人的回报率(提高49个百分点)。采用Karlan和Zinman(2009)方法的一个变体,我们分解了对还款的总效应,发现其中约三分之二可归因于道德风险,三分之一可归因于逆向选择。此外,获得数字担保的学费贷款显著提高了入学率和教育相关支出,且未对家庭资产负债表产生不利影响。
Abstract
Abstract A new form of secured lending using “digital collateral” has recently emerged, most prominently in low- and middle-income countries. Digital collateral relies on lockout technology, which allows the lender to temporarily disable the flow value of the collateral to the borrower without physically repossessing it. We explore this new form of credit in a model and a field experiment using school-fee loans digitally secured with a solar home system. Securing a loan with digital collateral drastically reduced default rates (by 19 percentage points) and increased the lender’s rate of return (by 49 percentage points). Using a variant of the Karlan and Zinman (2009) methodology, we decompose the total effect on repayment and find that roughly two-thirds is attributable to moral hazard, and one-third to adverse selection. In addition, access to digitally secured school-fee loans significantly increased school enrollment and school-related expenditures without detrimental effects on households’ balance sheets.