Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico’s Labour Courts
Review of Economic Studies · 2024 · Joyce Sadka、Enrique Seira、Christopher Woodruff
中文摘要
运转良好的法院对于金融经济和实体经济的健康发展都至关重要。大多数较低收入国家的法院运转不佳，但其绩效不佳的根本原因尚未得到充分理解。我们利用正在审理的案件开展实地实验，以分析墨西哥最大劳动法院功能失调的根源。我们向当事人提供针对其案件结果的个性化预测，并发现这一信息使和解率提高了近一倍，同时缩短了平均案件审理时长。该实验首次在真实庭审案件中提供实验证据，表明减少信息不对称会降低拖延程度，这一结果与许多谈判理论的预测一致。我们还发现，信息处理仅在原告亲自在场并直接接收信息时才有效，这表明原告与其私人律师之间存在代理问题。以折现后的赔付金额和支付账单的能力衡量，对大多数劳动者而言，该处理似乎改善了其福利。
Abstract
Abstract Well-functioning courts are essential for the health of both financial and real economies. Courts function poorly in most lower-income countries, but the root causes of poor performance are not well understood. We use field experiments with ongoing cases to analyse sources of dysfunction in Mexico’s largest labour court. We provide parties with personalized predictions for case outcomes and show that this information nearly doubles settlement rates and reduces average case duration. The experiment generates the first experimental evidence in live court cases that reducing information asymmetries results in a decrease in delay, an outcome predicted by many theories of bargaining. We also find that the information treatment is effective only when the plaintiff is present to receive it directly, suggesting agency issues between plaintiffs and their private lawyers. For most workers, the treatment appears to improve welfare, as measured by discounted payouts and ability to pay bills.