审讯机制设计
Designing Interrogations
Review of Economic Studies · 2024 · [{"name": "Alessandro Ispano", "affiliation": ["Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique"]}, {"name": "Péter Vida", "affiliation": ["Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique", "Corvinus University of Budapest", "Théorie Économique, Modélisation et Applications", "CY Cergy Paris Université", "Institute of Economics"]}]
中文摘要
本文构建了一个具有双边不对称信息的审讯模型。嫌疑人知道自己是有罪还是无罪，也知道执法者证据的可能强度；该证据不仅能提供关于嫌疑人是否有罪的信息，还可能戳穿谎言。我们比较了一次性讯问均衡与完全承诺下最优机制中的起诉错误。我们描述了一种带有证据披露的往复式讯问，该讯问无需任何承诺，即可在均衡中实现最优结果。
Abstract
Abstract We provide a model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of the law enforcer’s evidence, which is informative about the suspect’s status and may also disprove lies. We compare prosecution errors in the equilibrium of the one-shot interrogation and in the optimal mechanism under full commitment. We describe a back-and-forth interrogation with disclosure of the evidence that implements the optimum in equilibrium without any commitment.