连锁餐厅卡路里标示法、肥胖与消费者福利

中文摘要

本文考察要求连锁餐厅在菜单和菜单板上标示卡路里的法律是否有效以及为何有效。我们构建了一个卡路里消费模型，着重说明这些法律影响选择的多种潜在渠道，并提出一种区分这些替代机制的实证策略。我们使用行为风险因素监测系统（BRFSS）中有关身体质量指数和消费者福祉的数据，以及我们自行开展的调查来检验模型预测；这些调查考察了该法律如何影响人们的就餐地点，以及随机接触卡路里信息如何影响人们对菜单菜品的感受。综合来看，我们的结果与这样一种经济学模型一致：卡路里标签既通过提供显著信息影响消费者，也通过对不健康饮食施加降低福利的道德成本（或内疚感）来影响消费者。

Abstract

This paper investigates whether and why laws requiring chain restaurants to post calories on menus and menu boards work. We develop a model of calories consumed that highlights multiple potential channels through which these laws influence choice and that outlines an empirical strategy to disentangle these alternatives. We test the predictions of our model using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System on body mass index and consumer well-being, as well as our own surveys on how the law influences where people eat and how randomized exposure to calorie information affects feelings toward menu items. Viewed in its totality, our results are consistent with an economic model in which calorie labels influence consumers both by providing salient information and by imposing a welfare-reducing moral cost (or feelings of guilt) on unhealthy eating.