移民抽签制度设计：H-1B改革的人为设计后果与偶然后果
Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms
Review of Economics and Statistics · 2022 · [{"name": "Parag A. Pathak", "affiliation": ["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"]}, {"name": "Alex Rees-Jones", "affiliation": ["University of Pennsylvania"]}, {"name": "Tayfun Sönmez", "affiliation": ["Boston College"]}]
中文摘要
2004年《H-1B签证改革法》规定每年分配85,000个签证名额，其中20,000个为具有高等学位的申请人保留。我们将该法案的主要要求表述为形式公理，并刻画了与这些公理一致的签证分配规则。尽管预留名额有精确规定，但我们表明，在平均年份，满足这些公理的不同实施方式可使高等学位申请人获得的签证数量相差多达14,000个。在所有满足这些公理的规则中，2019年通过行政命令实施的规则对高等学位持有者最为有利。然而，此前两次修改所导致的变化更大，且可能并非有意为之。
Abstract
Abstract The H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004 dictates an annual allocation of 85,000 visas with 20,000 reserved for advanced-degree applicants. We represent the main requirements of this legislation as formal axioms and characterize visa allocation rules consistent with the axioms. Despite the precise number reserved, we show that the range of implementations satisfying these axioms can change the allocation of advanced-degree visas by as much as 14,000 in an average year. Of all rules satisfying these axioms, the 2019 rule imposed by executive order is most favorable to advanced-degree holders. However, two earlier modifications resulted in larger changes, possibly unintentionally.