Review of Economics and Statistics · 2024 · Kevin Lang、Kaiwen Leong、Huailu Li、Haibo Xu
中文摘要
我们利用新加坡向逾1,000名借款人发放的逾11,000笔无牌照贷款的数据，提供了有关非法放贷这一研究不足的市场的基本信息。借款人与贷款人互动频繁，主要依靠关系型合约来确保协议得到履行。借款人贴现率高，往往存在赌博和/或物质滥用问题，且经常逾期还款。尽管贷款人有时会诉诸非金钱惩罚，但逾期还款的主要成本来自以极高的利率按复利计息。一次打击非法放贷的行动使利率上升、贷款规模缩小，这与我们关于贷款人无法攫取全部经济剩余的观点一致。
Abstract
Abstract Using over 11,000 unlicensed loans to over 1,000 borrowers in Singapore, we provide basic information about an understudied market: illegal moneylending. Borrowers and lenders interact frequently and rely primarily on relational contracts to enforce their agreements. Borrowers have high discount rates, often have gambling and/or substance abuse problems, and often repay late. While lenders sometimes resort to nonfinancial punishments, the primary cost of late repayment is the compounding of a very high interest rate. Consistent with our view that lenders cannot extract all surplus, a crackdown on illegal lending raised interest rates and lowered the size of loans.