参照依赖偏好的政治含义
The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences,
Journal of the European Economic Association · 2026 · [{"name": "Fausto Panunzi", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research", "Bocconi University"]}, {"name": "Nicola Pavoni", "affiliation": ["Bocconi University"]}, {"name": "Guido Tabellini", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research", "Bocconi University"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 本文研究安全型现任者与风险型挑战者之间围绕再分配税收展开的选举竞争。在参照点依赖偏好下，经济上失望的选民会转变为风险爱好者，因而被风险更高的候选人所吸引。我们表明，均衡可能呈现政策分化：内在风险更高的候选人主张更低的税收，并获得由极富有选民与极度失望选民构成的联盟支持，而安全型候选人则主张更高的税收。这可以解释为什么右翼民粹主义政党往往得到经济上不满的选民支持，却以低再分配的政策纲领参加竞选。
Abstract
Abstract This paper studies electoral competition over redistributive taxation between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent. With reference-dependent preferences, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and hence are attracted by the more risky candidate. We show that the equilibrium can display policy divergence: the intrinsically more risky candidate proposes lower taxes and is supported by a coalition of very rich and very disappointed voters, while the safe candidate proposes higher taxes. This can explain why right-wing populist parties are often supported by economically dissatisfied voters and yet they run on policy platforms of low redistribution.