对劳动者流动性施加法律限制的劳动力市场效应

中文摘要

我们分析竞业限制协议（NCAs）的法律可执行性如何影响劳动力市场。利用新构建的面板数据，我们发现，较高的竞业限制协议可执行性会降低劳动者的收入和职业流动性，且在最有可能签署竞业限制协议的劳动者中效应更大。这些效应影响深远：提高可执行性会对州界之外的劳动者产生外部性，表明其对劳动力市场活力具有广泛影响。我们表明，可执行性通过减少外部选择、阻止劳动者利用紧张的劳动力市场来提高收入，从而影响工资。我们用一个搜寻与议价模型来阐释这些发现。最后，较高的竞业限制协议可执行性会加剧性别和种族收入差距。

Abstract

We analyze how the legal enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) affects labor markets. Using newly constructed panel data, we find that higher NCA enforceability diminishes workers’ earnings and job mobility, with larger effects among workers most likely to sign NCAs. These effects are far-reaching: increasing enforceability imposes externalities on workers across state borders, suggesting broad effects on labor market dynamism. We show that enforceability affects wages by reducing outside options and preventing workers from leveraging tight labor markets to increase earnings. We motivate these findings with a model of search and bargaining. Finally, higher NCA enforceability exacerbates gender and racial earnings gaps.