没有暴力垄断的征税垄断：弱国家征税的权衡取舍
Monopoly of Taxation Without a Monopoly of Violence: The Weak State’s Trade-Offs From Taxation
Review of Economic Studies · 2024 · [{"name": "Soeren Henn", "affiliation": ["University of Newcastle Australia", "Newcastle University"]}, {"name": "Christian Mugaruka", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Miguel Ortiz", "affiliation": ["University of California, Berkeley"]}, {"name": "Raúl Sierra", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "University of Chicago"]}, {"name": "David Wu", "affiliation": ["University of California, Berkeley"]}]
中文摘要
本研究以刚果民主共和国腹地的一项案例研究为基础，从新的经济学视角审视国家构建问题。我们探讨了将叛军视为固定匪帮这一设定对国家的影响。当国家通过军事行动使叛军无法征税时，却无意中促使他们转而劫掠那些此前更愿意向其征税的公民的资产。相反，当国家选择与叛军谈判时，这种效应并未出现，但谈判损害了国家的合法性，并促使新叛军的出现。研究结果表明，弱国家若试图在腹地增加征税，可能会以中期的安全和长期的国家完整性为代价。
Abstract
Abstract This study presents a new economic perspective on state-building based on a case study in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s hinterland. We explore the implications for the state of considering rebels as stationary bandits. When the state, through a military operation, made it impossible for rebels to levy taxes, it inadvertently encouraged them to plunder the assets of the very citizens they previously preferred to tax. When it negotiated with rebels instead, this effect was absent, but negotiating compromised the state’s legitimacy and prompted the emergence of new rebels. The findings suggest that attempting to increase taxation by a weak state in the hinterland could come at the expense of safety in the medium term and of the integrity of the state in the long term.