手续成本与信息：处方药监测项目如何减少阿片类药物处方？
Hassle Costs versus Information: How Do Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Reduce Opioid Prescribing?
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2024 · [{"name": "Abby Alpert", "affiliation": ["University of Pennsylvania"]}, {"name": "Sarah Dykstra", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Mireille Jacobson", "affiliation": ["University of Southern California"]}]
中文摘要
我们研究手续成本与信息提供在解释处方药监测项目（PDMPs）如何减少阿片类药物处方中的作用。PDMPs 旨在通过提供信息来减少阿片类药物处方，但也可能因强制记录核查所带来的手续负担而无意中影响处方行为。我们分析肯塔基州具有里程碑意义的 PDMP，以区分这两种机制。手续成本全面减少了阿片类药物处方，包括对从未使用过阿片类药物的患者；然而，医生仍继续为最能从中获益的患者开具阿片类药物。尽管信息提供也影响处方行为，但手续成本解释了降幅中的大部分。对开具高风险药物引入成本，提高了治疗的针对性。（JEL H75, I11, I12, I18, L65）
Abstract
We study hassle costs versus information provision in explaining how prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) decrease opioid prescribing. PDMPs aim to reduce opioid prescribing through information provision but may also unintentionally affect prescribing through the hassle of required record checks. We analyze Kentucky’s landmark PDMP to disentangle these two mechanisms. Hassle costs reduce opioid prescribing across the board, including to opioid-naïve patients; however, physicians continue to prescribe opioids to patients who would benefit the most. Although information also affects prescribing, hassle costs explain the majority of the decline. Introducing a cost to prescribing high-risk medications improves the targeting of treatment. (JEL H75, I11, I12, I18, L65)