移民、搜寻与再分配：对本地居民福利的量化评估

Journal of the European Economic Association · 2014 · [{"name": "Michèle Battisti", "affiliation": ["Ifo Institute for Economic Research"]}, {"name": "Gabriel Felbermayr", "affiliation": ["Ifo Institute for Economic Research"]}, {"name": "Giovanni Peri", "affiliation": ["University of California, Davis"]}, {"name": "Panu Poutvaara", "affiliation": ["Ifo Institute for Economic Research", "IZA - Institute of Labor Economics", "Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München"]}]

中文摘要

摘要 Stark 和 Byra（2025）指出，Battisti 等（2018）补充文件中资本收入的计算存在一处错误，并指出在存在工资税的情况下，我们的工资议价方程并不对应纳什议价解。我们承认这两点，并感谢作者指出这些问题。我们在 Battisti 等（2018）中使用的议价解是具有固定剩余份额的 Kalai（1977）比例议价解，而非纳什议价。在回复中，我们表明，如果将模型校准至工资税率，那么在维持原有 Kalai 议价的情况下，纠正编码错误仅对我们的原始结果产生轻微影响。如果我们同时改用纳什议价解，移民带来的估计收益会变小。福利效应取决于议价的具体性质，并且在 Kalai 比例议价下往往更大。此时，移民带来的平均总福利收益对低技能和高技能本地人均为 0.37%，而不是 Battisti 等（2018）中高技能本地人的 1.25% 和低技能本地人的 1.00%。

Abstract

Abstract Stark and Byra identify a mistake in how capital income is calculated in the supplementary files of Battisti et al. and point out that our wage bargaining equation does not correspond to the Nash bargaining solution in the presence of wage taxation. We acknowledge both points and thank the authors for pointing out these issues. The bargaining solution we use in Battisti et al. is the Kalai proportional bargaining solution with fixed surplus shares, not Nash bargaining. In our reply, we show that if we calibrate the model to wage tax rates, correcting the coding mistake has only a minor effect on our original results if maintaining the original Kalai bargaining. If we also switch to the Nash bargaining solution, the estimated gains from immigration become smaller. Welfare effects depend on the precise nature of bargaining and tend to be larger with Kalai proportional bargaining. Under Nash bargaining, average total welfare gains from immigration are 0.37% for both low-skilled and high-skilled natives, instead of 1.25% for high-skilled and 1.00% for low-skilled natives in Battisti et al.