医药市场的市场力量与监管
Market Power and Regulation in Pharmaceutical Markets
Journal of the European Economic Association · 2026 · [{"name": "Klaus Gugler", "affiliation": ["Vienna University of Economics and Business"]}, {"name": "Lukas Pirnbacher", "affiliation": ["Vienna University of Economics and Business"]}, {"name": "Florian Szücs", "affiliation": ["Vienna University of Economics and Business"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 我们利用奥地利药品市场的监管环境，研究价格监管对市场结果与消费者福利的影响。我们发现，药品生产商的产品收购在受监管与不受监管的市场细分中具有不同的影响。回归结果显示，在缺乏监管的细分市场，并购 (M&A) 抬高了价格。尽管两个细分市场的产品种类均有所减少，但在监管下这一效应更小。反事实模拟证实了价格约束具有约束力，并表明并购在不受监管的细分市场造成了适度的消费者剩余损失，而在受监管的细分市场福利保持不变。因此，监管能够成功缓解市场势力的影响。
Abstract
Abstract We exploit the regulatory environment in the Austrian pharmaceutical market to study the effects of price regulation on market outcomes and consumer welfare. We find that product acquisitions of drug producers have a differential impact in regulated and unregulated market segments. Regression results show that M&A increase prices where regulation is absent. While variety decreases in both segments, the effects are smaller under regulation. Counterfactual simulations confirm binding price constraints and show that mergers caused modest consumer surplus losses in unregulated segments, while welfare remained unchanged in regulated ones. Thus, regulation can successfully mitigate the effects of market power.