AER: Insights · 2024 · [{"name": "Bård Harstad", "affiliation": ["Stanford University"]}]
中文摘要
国际贸易与自然资源开发以多种方式相互作用。本文首先构建一个动态博弈模型：南方（S）为出口（如木材和农产品）而开发资源（如毁林）。由于负外部性的存在，除非资源已被耗尽，否则北方可能因贸易而受损。南方预见到这一点，会加快资源开发速度。如果不受重新谈判影响的关税能够以剩余资源存量的大小为条件，所有负面结果都将逆转。更大的贸易收益和更有利的贸易条件可用于减缓资源开发。结合出口补贴，可实现最优结果。（JEL C73, D62, F11, F13, F18, Q23, Q57）
Abstract
International trade and natural resource exploitation interact in multiple ways. This paper first presents a dynamic game in which the South (S) exploits (e.g., deforests) in order to export (e.g., lumber and agricultural products). Because of negative externalities, the North might lose from trade, unless the resource has already been depleted. Anticipating this, S exploits faster. All negative results are reversed if renegotiation-proof tariffs can be contingent on the size of the remaining resource stock. Larger gains from trade, and more attractive terms of trade, can be used to slow exploitation. Combined with export subsidies, the outcome is first best. (JEL C73, D62, F11, F13, F18, Q23, Q57)