中央银行与公众沟通：前景可期还是虚妄之望？
Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?
Journal of Economic Literature · 2024 · [{"name": "Alan S. Blinder", "affiliation": ["Princeton University"]}, {"name": "Michael Ehrmann", "affiliation": ["European Central Bank"]}, {"name": "Jakob de Haan", "affiliation": ["University of Groningen"]}, {"name": "David‐Jan Jansen", "affiliation": ["Tinbergen Institute", "De Nederlandsche Bank"]}]
中文摘要
中央银行日益加强与公众的接触，以说明并解释其货币政策行动的动机。此类外联的一项主要目标是确保问责并建立信任，另一项目标则是引导通胀预期。本文综述了近年迅速增长的、关于中央银行与公众（而非金融市场）沟通的文献。我们首先讨论此类沟通为何重要，以及为何它比与专家受众沟通更具挑战性。随后，我们转向沟通方法：中央银行如何设法接触公众，又是否取得了成功？接下来，也是尤为重要的一点，我们综述了有关这种新的外联活动在多大程度上影响通胀预期的实证证据。总体而言，我们认为，更好地向公众传递信息具有一定潜力，但在此过程中仍面临诸多挑战。(JEL D83, D84, E31, E52, E58, G53)
Abstract
Central banks are increasingly reaching out to the general public to motivate and explain their monetary policy actions. One major aim of this outreach is to ensure accountability and create trust; another is to guide inflation expectations. This article surveys a rapidly growing literature on central bank communication with the public, rather than with the financial markets. We first discuss why such communication matters and is more challenging than communicating with expert audiences. Then we turn to methods: How do central banks try to reach the public, and do they succeed? Next, and importantly, we survey the empirical evidence on the extent to which this new outreach affects inflation expectations. On balance, we see some promise in the potential to inform the public better, but many challenges along the way. (JEL D83, D84, E31, E52, E58, G53)