中文摘要
我们综述了关于非民主政体政治经济学的近期理论与实证文献。非民主政权的统治面临多重挑战，既包括宫廷政变或其支持联盟瓦解等内部挑战，也包括大规模抗议或革命等外部挑战。我们从最大化政权在这些挑战下存续概率的角度，分析独裁者所作的战略决策，并说明这一视角如何解释多种常见模式，包括任用政治忠诚者担任需要胜任能力的职位、以牺牲官僚体系效率为代价限制媒体自由、开展宣传运动、组织选举舞弊、清洗反对者和同僚，以及镇压公民。(JEL D72, D73, D82, D83, L82, O17)
Abstract
We survey recent theoretical and empirical literature on political economics of non-democracies. Nondemocratic regimes face multiple challenges to their rule, both internal, such as palace coups or breakdown of their support coalition, and external, such as mass protests or revolutions. We analyze strategic decisions made by dictators from the standpoint of maximizing the chances of regime survival in the light of these challenges, and show how it explains multiple common patterns, from hiring political loyalists to positions that require competence, to restricting media freedom at the cost of sacrificing bureaucratic efficiency, to running propaganda campaigns, organizing election fraud, purging opponents and associates, and repressing citizens. (JEL D72, D73, D82, D83, L82, O17)