中文摘要
我们综述了关于社会激励的证据，即与同事、下属、上司、客户及其他人的社会互动如何塑造组织中代理人的努力选择。我们提出了一种二维分类法，依据是：（a）社会群体是横向的（处于同一层级的同伴）还是纵向的（组织内部或外部处于不同层级的个体）；（b）代理人的努力是否对其社会群体中的其他成员产生外部性。我们展示了社会激励提高生产率的情境，以及降低生产率的情境。在大多数情况下，效应大小约为10%，相当于绩效薪酬典型效应的一半。我们还表明，社会激励可能干扰金钱激励，使后者失效，甚至产生有害影响。我们得出结论：社会激励是一种强大的激励因素，组织政策的设计必须将其纳入考虑；同时，还需要更多研究来理解政策如何塑造支撑这些激励的偏好。
Abstract
We review the evidence on social incentives, namely on how social interactions with colleagues, subordinates, bosses, customers, and others shape agents’ effort choices in organizations. We propose a two-way taxonomy based on ( a) whether the social group is horizontal (peers at the same level of the hierarchy) or vertical (individuals at different levels within or outside of the organization) and ( b) whether the agent's effort creates externalities for the other members of their social group. We show settings in which social incentives improve productivity and settings in which they reduce it. In most cases, the size of the effect is approximately 10%, which is half of the typical effect of performance pay. We also show that social incentives can interfere with financial incentives, making them ineffective or even detrimental. We conclude that social incentives are a powerful motivator that must be taken into account in the design of organizational policies and that more research is needed to understand how policies can shape the preferences that underpin these incentives.