Annual Review of Economics · 2018 · [{"name": "Katherine Casey", "affiliation": ["Stanford University"]}]
中文摘要
关于分权的经典论点，加之参与能够赋权穷人的理念，共同构成了对外援助中广泛采用的社区驱动型发展（CDD）模式的理论依据。CDD 将公共品的选择、实施和财务管理的控制权下放给社区。直到最近，政策热情仍远超证据支持。我综合了随机对照试验的研究结果，发现CDD能够在困难环境中以较低成本有效提供公共品，并带来适度的经济回报。然而，几乎没有证据表明CDD能够以任何持久的方式改变地方决策或赋权穷人。这一失败的部分原因可能在于，一些被认为重要的约束——如社会资本不足——似乎并不构成实际制约。另一些约束，如排他性的地方制度，确实构成问题，但CDD并不能解决这些问题。这些结果提出了一个难题：在尽量减少施加于穷人时间的机会成本的同时，需要多大程度的参与，才能保障这种极端分权所带来的收益？
Abstract
Classic arguments for decentralization, augmented by ideas about how participation empowers the poor, motivate the widely used approach in foreign aid called community-driven development (CDD). CDD devolves control over the selection, implementation, and financial management of public goods to communities. Until recently, policy enthusiasm has outstripped the evidence. I synthesize findings from randomized controlled trials and find that CDD effectively delivers public goods and modest economic returns at low cost in difficult environments. There is little evidence, however, that CDD transforms local decision making or empowers the poor in any enduring way. Part of this failure may be because some constraints believed to be important—like insufficient social capital—appear not to bind. Others, like exclusive local institutions, are a problem, although not one that CDD remedies. These results present a conundrum: How much participation is enough to safeguard the gains of such extreme decentralization while minimizing the opportunity costs imposed on poor people's time?