The Welfare Effects of Conditioning the Potential Duration of UI Benefits on Prior Work History
NBER Working Papers · 2026 · [{"name": "Leonard Goff", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Simon Quach", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
大多数失业保险（UI）制度依据申领者的既往工作经历设定潜在给付期限，但关于这种做法是否具有社会最优性，现有证据甚少。我们利用加拿大失业保险制度中的25个断点回归来研究这一问题：在该制度下，当既往工作小时数跨越不同门槛时，给付期限会出现离散式增加。基于覆盖1997年至2018年全部失业保险申领记录的行政数据，我们估计了在工作经历分布的不同位置延长潜在给付期限所产生的财政效应。平均而言，潜在给付期限每增加一周，失业时长延长0.30周，政府支出增加96美元。然而，这一平均效应掩盖了显著的异质性：机械成本随既往工作小时数的增加而急剧下降，而行为成本则温和上升。因此，延长失业保险给付期限所产生的财政外部性随劳动力市场依附程度的提高而上升。将这些估计结果纳入充分统计量框架后，我们发现，统一延长给付期限所产生的财政外部性比仅面向工作经历较短申领者的定向延长高76%。此外，通过将福利从工作小时数较高的申领者重新分配给工作小时数较低的申领者，可以在零财政成本下提高总体福利。
Abstract
Most unemployment insurance (UI) systems condition the potential duration of benefits on claimants' work history, yet little evidence exists on whether doing so is socially optimal. We study this question using 25 regression discontinuities in Canada's UI system, where benefit duration increases discretely when prior hours worked crosses various thresholds. Using administrative records covering the universe of UI claims from 1997 to 2018, we estimate the fiscal effects of extending potential duration across the work-history distribution. On average, an additional week lengthens unemployment by 0.30 weeks and costs the government $96. However, this average effect masks significant heterogeneity: the mechanical cost falls steeply with prior hours, while the behavioral cost increases modestly. Consequently, the fiscal externality of extending UI rises with labor market attachment. Embedding these estimates in a sufficient statistics framework, we find that the fiscal externality of a uniform extension is 76% larger than that of an extension targeted at claimants with short histories. Moreover, aggregate welfare can be raised at zero fiscal cost by redistributing benefits from high to low hour claimants.